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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Kenneth M. Murchison*
The United States Supreme Court gave considerable attention to
legal problems affecting local governments during its 1984-1985 term.
Among the subjects the Court addressed were the standard for awarding
compensation when the federal government condemns the property of
local governments,' the scope of governmental liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,2 the procedural due process to which governmental employees
are entitled when they are discharged,3 and the constitutional limits on
local zoning power.4 In addition, the 1984-1985 term also produced
decisions redefining the scope of congressional power to regulate the
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451 (1985) (fifth amendment does
not require the United States to pay a public condemnee compensation measured by the
cost of acquiring a substitute facility when the fair market value of the condemned
property is ascertainable and when awarding market value would not produce manifest
injustice).
2. Kentucky v. Graham, 105 S. Ct. 3099 (1985) (plaintiff who prevails in § 1983
action against defendants in their individual capacities is not entitled to recover his attorney
fees from defendants' governmental employer); Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985)
(plaintiff who refused a settlement offer that was more favorable than his final judgment
is not entitled to recover attorney's fees for services provided after refusal of the settlement
offer); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985) (police officer's single
act of unusually excessive force does not prove a policy or custom sufficient to impose
§ 1983 liability on municipality that employed officer); Webb v. Board of Educ., 105 S.
Ct. 1923 (1985) (teacher who successfully challenges his dismissal under § 1983 is not
entitled to attorney fees for his counsel's services during administrative hearing before
the defendant school board); Brandon v. Holt, 105 S. Ct. 873 (1985) (municipal official
who is sued in his official, and not his individual, capacity is not entitled to qualified
immunity defense).
3. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985) (due process
requires that school district employee receive an opportunity to respond to charges against
him before his discharge becomes effective).
4. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) (city
requirement that proposed group home for the mentally retarded obtain a special use
permit lacked a rational basis and thus violated Equal Protection Clause even though
mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification); Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985) (land developer's taking
claim is not ripe until local government reaches a final decision regarding the application
of its regulations to the property at issue and the land developer has exhausted state law
procedures for obtaining just compensation).
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actions of states and local governments5 and analyzing the extent to
which Congress has exercised that power in the antitrust laws and other
statutory schemes. 6 This article analyzes these last two groups of decisions
as well as a 1984 statute7 that specifically exempts local governments
from the civil damages remedies of the antitrust laws.
At the state level, Louisiana's appellate courts rendered their usual assort-
ment of decisions in cases involving local governments. The courts issued
opinions addressing a variety of subjects including the relations of local govern-
ments to the state8 and to other local governments, 9 election challenges, 0
5. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985); see
infra notes 20-62 and accompanying text.
6. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2371
(1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985); see infra notes
63-92 and accompanying text. See also Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
105 S. Ct. 717 (1985) (federal statute establishing fifty-five as mandatory retirement age
for fire fighters does not amount to a congressional determination that fifty-five is a
bona fide occupational qualification for nonfederal fire fighters under the Age Discrim-
ination Act).
7. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750
(1984); see infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Francis v. Morial, 455 So. 2d 1168 (La. 1984) (statute altering the
procedures for selecting the members of an administrative board of a municipality with
a home rule charter is an unconstitutional interference with the municipality's organization
and with the distribution of its powers and functions); Hubbard v. Department of City
Civil Serv., 466 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985) (civil service commission regulation
prevailed over conflicting statute relating to appeals from disciplinary actions); New Orleans
Firefighters Ass'n v. City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 459 So. 2d 1204 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 463 So. 2d 1319, 1322 (La. 1985) (because state law requires overtime rates
only for hours in excess of sixty hours per week, commission may exclude state supple-
mental pay in computing local overtime rates for less than sixty hours per week). Cf.
Reaux v. Iberia Parish Police Jury, 454 So. 2d 227 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 458
So. 2d 120 (La. 1984) (sale of land to heirs of original owner who conveyed it to parish
in 1942 for a nominal price would constitute a disguised donation from a political
subdivision to an individual in violation of art. 7, § 14 of the state constitution); Crist
v. Parish, of Jefferson, 470 So. 2d 306 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985) (parish policy of granting
terminal leave compensation to employees violated state constitution provision forbidding
political subdivisions from donating thing of value to private persons).
9. See Orleans Parish School Bd. v. City of New Orleans, 468 So. 2d 709 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1985) (municipal ordinance that required school board to obtain city council
approval before final determination of school sites did not interfere with board's power
to select locations of school houses where board still had power to choose where it wished
to place buildings and the ordinance simply insured that the decision was made in a
reasonable manner).
10. St. John the Baptist Parish Ass'n of Educators v. Brown, 465 So. 2d 674 (La.
1985) (school board could not call referendum to submit question of whether union should
be recognized as a bargaining agent); Page v. Madere, 469 So. 2d 1036 (La. App. 5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 467 So. 2d 1122 (La. 1985) (general testimony of registrar of voters
that she did not require each signature on the petition to be meticulously matched against
the roll of registered voters does not prove irregularity in specific signatures); Stephens
v. Madison Parish Police Jury, 463 So. 2d 609 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985) (police jury
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voting district is not equivalent to a ward for purposes of holding a local option election);
Leray v. Mullican, 456 So. 2d 1038 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 458 So. 2d 128
(La. 1984) (absentee ballot that was not marked by a punched hole but by a check mark
next to the candidate's name was void because the penciled check mark was a distinguishing
mark capable of identification); Aiple v. Naccari, 454 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 456 So. 2d 151 (La. 1984) (requirement that candidate for judgeship have
been admitted to practice of law five years "prior to his election" required that candidate's
five years accrue before the general election rather than before the primary).
11. See Williams v. Board of Ethics for Elected Officials, 457 So. 2d 772 (La. App.
1st Cir.), cert. denied, 460 So. 2d 611 (La. 1984) (accepting nomination to a position
that is subject to approval by police jury of which nominee is a member violates state
ethics law); Broussard v. Town of Delcambre, 458 So. 2d 1003 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984)
(constitutional requirement that judges be elected did not apply to magistrates appointed
to function in mayor's courts).
12. The bulk of the employee cases involve disciplinary actions against civil service
employees. See, e.g., Walters v. Department of Police, 454 So. 2d 106 (La. 1984) (where
evidence is insufficient to support civil service commission's finding of criminal negligence
but record contains other evidence of misconduct, proper remedy is to remand case to
the commission for further proceedings); Blake v. Mosquito Control Bd., 470 So. 2d 193
(La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 So. 2d 921 (La. 1985) (public employee is entitled
to costs and attorney fees for employer's frivolous appeal from civil service commission
order reinstating employee); Owens v. City of Jennings Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv.
Bd., 454 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984) (second unwed pregnancy is not an "immoral
act" justifying police officer's dismissal).
During the past year, the fourth circuit has been particularly active in trying to explain
what disciplinary actions are appropriate for employees who violate sick leave regulations.
Compare, e.g., Bruno v. Department of Police, 451 So. 2d 1082 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 462 So. 2d 139 (La. 1985) (intentional violation of sick leave regulations
provides adequate cause for dismissal of president of police officers' union); and Morgan
v. Chief Admin. Office, 455 So. 2d 1242 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 So. 2d
541 (La. 1984) (appearance before city council to make unwarranted accusations against
supervisors while on sick leave warranted dismissal) with Imborone v. Department of
Police, 461 So. 2d 1095 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984), aff'd with modification, 462 So. 2d
1256 (La. 1985) (requirement that police officer on sick leave notify supervisor before
leaving home did not justify dismissal of officer whose doctor had notified department
that officer could not return to work but could attend law school classes at night).
Other significant decisions discussed the authority of civil service commissions in
nondisciplinary proceedings, see, e.g., In re First Parish Court Employees, 454 So. 2d
1190 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984) (Jefferson Parish Personnel Board lacks authority to
terminate the civil service status of employees of the parish court) and disciplinary actions
against public school teachers, see, e.g., Brown v. Red River Parish School Bd.,469 So.
2d 1110 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985) (school teacher who was reprimanded and placed on
probation need not pursue grievance procedures before seeking judicial review under the
Teacher Tenure Act); Long v. Lafourche Parish School Bd., 460 So. 2d 651 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1984) (teacher who had held position of principal for two years and assistant
principal at same salary for third year could not have salary reduced without compliance
with provisions of the Teacher Tenure Act).
13. See, e.g., City of Lake Charles v. Chaney, 468 So. 2d 1191 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1985) (city ordinances requiring itinerant vendors to move to a new site every two days
and requiring that each new location be at least 1,000 feet from prior location were
invalid exercises of the police power because they were not reasonably related to legitimate
1986l
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zoning" and other land-use regulations,' 5  public contracts, 6
governmental powers of protecting health of citizens, property, and aesthetic values);
Bundrick v. Lafayette Parish Police Jury, 462 So. 2d 1319 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985)
(resolution establishing a ten-ton load limit for streets in subdivision was constitutional
as a reasonable exercise of the police power).
14. See, e.g., Redfearn v. Creppel, 455 So. 2d 1356 (La. 1984), aff'g in part and
rev'g in part, 436 So. 2d 1210 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (hotel that qualifies as a
nonconforming use may be converted to a restaurant, which is not a less restricted use
under municipal zoning ordinance); Hammons v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 461 So.
2d 1225 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984) (granting of parish building permits does not authorize
violation of private building restriction prohibiting placement of mobile homes in sub-
division); Schmitt v. City of New Orleans, 461 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 464 So. 2d 318, 319 (La. 1985) (landowner did not have to appeal to board
of adjustment prior to bringing mandamus action where landowner was challenging validity
of the ordinance rather than its enforcement); Kaplan Telephone Co. v. City of Kaplan
Bd. of Adjustment, 458 So. 2d 664 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 462 So. 2d
210 (La. 1985) (board's action in rescinding variance was invalid where it failed to give
proper notice of the meeting held to consider rescission); United Talent Assoc., Inc. v.
Parish of Jefferson, 457 So. 2d 1293 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 462 So. 2d
653 (La. 1985) (zoning appeals board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in distinguishing
between a restaurant and a lounge where zoning ordinance drew no such distinction);
Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. City of New Orleans, 455 So. 2d 1239 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 So. 2d 542 (La. 1984) (downgrading zoning of property is permissible even
though based in part upon objections voiced by voters residing in the areas when also
based on legitimate and reasonable concerns for public welfare in the affected areas).
15. See, e.g., Favrot v. Jefferson Parish Council, 470 So. 2d 286 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1985) (council resolutions revokingxdedication of public street were invalid where evidence
showed street remained necessary for public purposes); Sylvester v. St. Landry Parish
Police Jury, 461 So. 2d 534 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984) (police jury's abandonment of public
road was arbitrary and capricious where use of road by public was continuing and had
not diminished and jurors had voted for abandonment without any knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the roadway). A significant amount of litigation has focused
on when, and under what conditions, "community homes" for the mentally retarded may
be located in areas designated for single-family residences by zoning ordinances or sub-
division restrictions. Compare, e.g., Clark v. Manuel, 463 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1985) (com-
munity home for the mentally retarded was a "residential purpose" with respect to
subdivision restrictions, and statute that required sponsor of home to seek site approval
from local governing authority violated equal protection); and Concord Estates Home-
owners Assoc., Inc. v. Special Children's Foundation, Inc., 459 So. 2d 1242 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1984) (group home operated by a nonprofit corporation was a "single-family
dwelling" under subdivision restrictions in light of state statute defining such homes as
single-family units) with City of Kenner v. Normal Life of Louisiana, Inc., 465 So. 2d
82 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. granted, 470 So. 2d 115 (La. 1985) (statute defining community
home as single-family residence was not intended to override local zoning ordinances that
limit the number of unrelated persons in the definition of a single family).
16. See, e.g., Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. State, 470 So. 2d 976 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1985) (complaint of unsuccessful bidder alleging that bid had been divided to ac-
commodate successful bidders, that successful bidders misrepresented their bids, that one
bid and its bond were improperly identified, that one bid was improperly signed, that
several required changes were not included in successful bidders' forms, and that successful
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bidders failed to perform the contracts in good faith stated a cause of action for damages
against the state and the successful bidders); Grace Constr. Co. v. St. Charles Parish,
467 So. 2d 1371 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 470 So. 2d 124 (La. 1985) (where
parish failed to follow proper procedures for issuing addendum to invitation for bid,
neither parish nor trial judge had authority to accept the second lowest bid when the
first bid was found to be invalid); Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. City of Monroe, 465 So. 2d
882 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 467 So. 2d 538 (La. 1985) (contract providing that
waste company would construct, operate, and maintain landfill site at its sole cost and
expense and that city would deposit trash it collected at landfill for a set cost per ton
was a contract for services rather than a contract for "public work" within the meaning
of the Public Bid Law).
17. See generally, Dunne v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 463 So. 2d 1267 (La. 1985)
(school board was not liable for injuries to child using gymnastic rings without permission
because the rings, which were located in an unlocked gymnasium accessible to children
attending a dance recital elsewhere in the school building, did not present an unreasonable
risk of harm); Gabler v. Regent Dev. Corp., 470 So. 2d 149 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985)
(parish's negligence in providing inadequate drainage facilities was not proximate cause
of flooding that occurred after a heavy rainfall and thus flooding resulted from an "act
of God"); Bessard v. Marcello, 467 So. 2d 2 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985) (city's failure to
maintain stop sign despite constructive notice of obscurement constituted legal fault and
rendered city liable for damages resulting from intersectional collision notwithstanding
later negligence of both drivers); Foster v. Powdrill, 463 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1985) (district attorney is immune from civil liability for false arrest and imprisonment
based upon negligence in absence of allegation and proof of malice); Mayor and Council
of City of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1984) (city could not recover costs of extinguishing fire from the property owners whose
negligent actions caused the fire).
Several groups of decisions tried to provide clarifying guidance as to a number of
recurring problems. One such problem has been the supervisory responsibilities of school
employees; compare, e.g., Ferguson v. DeSoto Parish School Bd., 467 So. 2d 1257 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 So. 2d 978 (La. 1985) (teacher who was supervising forty
children and was within forty-five feet of softball game where plaintiff was struck in the
head was not negligent-in her supervision of the children); with Rollins v. Concordia
Parish School Bd., 465 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985) (evidence that two regular
classes were combined during recess to allow one teacher a free period and that supervising
teacher had observed the children were going too fast on the merry-go-round but had
left the situation without correcting it was sufficient to support finding of inadequate
supervision); cf. Augustus v. Joseph A. Craig Elementary School, 459 So. 2d 665 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1984) (school had duty to supervise children on grounds after school had
closed where group with which plaintiff was practicing had permission to use the school
grounds and a flyer distributed by teachers had assured parents that children would be
under tight supervision). A second problem was the liability of cities for missing covers
for sewerage drains, see Rigao v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 467 So. 2d 1263 (La. App.
4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 So. 2d 988 (La. 1985) (risk of harm caused by easy removability
of meter box cover is not unreasonable when balanced against the utility of the cover);
and Baker v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 466 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985) (city not
liable for injuries pedestrian suffered when she stepped into an uncovered water valve
box where there was no inherent defect in the valve box cover nor any unreasonable risk
that someone would remove the cover). A third was the applicability to recreational
19861
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None of the judicial decisions noted in the previous paragraph made
any very dramatic changes in existing law. On the other hand, the
Louisiana Legislature took an active interest in reforming the tort liability
rules previously established by the judiciary. The 1985 session produced
at least six statutes that attempted to modify the tort liability of local
governments,' 9 and the state law portion of this article focuses on those
new statutes.
FEDERAL-LocAL RELATIONS
Scope of Congressional Power
In 1976, a five-member majority of the United States Supreme Court
tried to reestablish judicially enforceable limits to Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce.20 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court
in National League of Cities v. Usery2' adhered to modern decisions
recognizing the "plenary" scope of congressional authority even as to
"purely intrastate activity" that "affects commerce among the states." ' 22
However, the National League of Cities majority insisted that an implied
prohibition, grounded in the Tenth Amendment 23 and in the principle
facilities owned by local governments of the statute granting tort immunity to owners of
noncommercial, nonprofit recreational facilities. See Landry v, State, 477 So. 2d 672 (La.
1985), rev'g, 466 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985) (statute granting landowners'
immunity for noncommercial, recreational use of land does not apply to individual who
fell while walking on the Lake Ponchartrain sea-wall owned by the levee board); Smith
v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 467 So. 2d 70 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985) (statute providing
immunity for recreational uses of land are inapplicable when persons are allowed to use
the property for purposes not associated with the recreational use); cf. Keelen v. State,
463 So. 2d 1287 (La. 1985) (statute granting landowners' immunity for undeveloped, non-
residential rural, or semi-rural land does not immunize state from liability for accident
in swimming pool located in state park).
18. See La Plante v. Stewart, 470 So. 2d 1018 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985) (school
effectiveness study designed to identify factors that affect learning performance did not
fall within any of the exclusions from the Public Records Act nor was the public's right
to examine records outweighed by any right of privacy of any participant in the study).
19. 1985 La. Acts Nos. 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, and 509. See infra notes 107-211
and accompanying text.
20. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
21. 426 U.S. 833, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
22. Id. at 840, 96 S. Ct. at 2469, citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 95 S.
Ct. 1792 (1975) and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
23. U.S. Const. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." Because the Tenth Amendment does not expressly indicate what powers
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of federalism on which the entire constitutional structure is premised,2 4
limited legislative power even when Congress was acting within the ambit
of its commerce power.
Drawing on the long series of decisions that have limited the federal
government's power to impose taxes directly on states and their local
governments, 25 Mr. Justice Rehnquist declared that an analogous prin-
ciple protected states and local governments from intrusive federal reg-
ulations. This principle immunized states and local governments from
all federal regulations that "directly displace" their "freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, ' 26 and
it rendered the 1974 statute27 that extended. the wage and hour provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of state and local gov-
ernments unconstitutional as such a direct impairment of traditional
governmental functions. 28
From the very beginning, the parameters of the National League of
Cities principle were uncertain. The majority's terms were far from self-
defining, and Justice Blackmun-whose vote was crucial to the creation
of the Court's majority-submitted a concurring opinion suggesting that
he would give National League of Cities a fairly narrow reading. In his
view, the National League of Cities majority had "adopt[ed] a balancing
approach [that] does not outlaw federal power in areas ... where the
are reserved to the states, Justice Stone once dismissed it, in a frequently quoted dictum,
as "a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941). See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 862-66, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 2479-81 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24. See 426 U.S. at 844, 96 S. Ct. at 2471, quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869):
Both the States and the United States existed before the Constitution. The
people,' through that instrument, established a more perfect union by substituting
a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens,
instead of the Confederate Government, which acted with power, greatly re-
stricted, only upon the States. But in many articles of the Constitution the
necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres, the inde-
pendent authority of the States, is distinctly recognized.
25. 426 U.S. at 843, 96 S. Ct. at 2470, citing New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
572, 66 S. Ct. 310 (1946). For a modern decision reviewing the development of the tax
immunity doctrine and applying it quite narrowly, see Massachusetts v. United States,
435 U.S. 444, 98 S. Ct. 1153 (1978).
As early as McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), the Court
recognized a similar immunity that protects federal instrumentalities from state taxes that
directly interfere with the performance of valid federal functions. Recent decisions have
also tended to construe that immunity narrowly. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico,
455 U.S. 720, 102 S. Ct. 1373 (1982).
26. 426 U.S. at 852, 96 S. Ct. at 2474.
27. Act of April 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55.
28. 426 U.S. at 852, 96 S. Ct. at 2474.
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federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state . . .compliance
with imposed federal standards would be essential." 2 9
In a series of decisions beginning in 1976 and continuing through
1983, the Court attempted to define the National League of Cities
principle in more detail. Although none of these later decisions actually
invalidated a federal statute, several sustained the federal legislation on
five-to-four votes, raising the possibility that future appointments might
shift the balance of power in favor of the states.
The decisions following National League of Cities did serve to mark
some of the boundaries of the immunity recognized by the 1976 decision.
First, a decision during the same term30 held that the immunity did not
apply to statutes based on Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 Because the underlying purpose of that amendment was
to limit state power to interfere with certain rights, the amendment
modified state sovereignty to the extent of subjecting states to federal
supremacy with respect to those rights.3 2 Second, the Court summarized
the elements of an immunity claim in a 1981 decision33 that supplied
the framework of analysis used in later decisions:
(1) The federal statute must directly regulate the "States as
States" and not merely displace state authority by enacting new reg-
ulations of private parties.
(2) The challenged statute "must address matters that are indis-
putably 'attribute[s] of state sovereignty.' "
(3) The effect of the federal regulation must directly impair the
ability of states and local governments "to structure integral oper-
ations in areas of traditional governmental functions." 3 4
29. Id. at 856, 96 S. Ct. at 2476 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
30. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976) (eleventh amendment
does not bar state employees' recovery of back pay awards for sexual discrimination
because that amendment is limited by the subsequent adoption of the enforcement pro-
visions of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment). Accord, City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 100 S. Ct. 1548 (1980) (fifteenth amendment).
31. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
32. 426 U.S. at 456, 96 S. Ct. at 2671: "When Congress acts pursuant to § 5 [of
the fourteenth amendment], not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary
within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one
section of the constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody
limitations on state authority."
33. Hodel v. Virgina Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88,
101 S. Ct. 2352, 2365-66 (1981).
34. Id. at 287-88, 101 S. Ct. at 2365-66; see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,
237-38, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1061-62 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764 n.28,
102 S. Ct. 2126, 2140 n.28 (1982); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S.
678, 684, 102 S. Ct. 1349, 1353-54 (1982).
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Third, the later decisions also indicated an acceptance of Justice Black-
mun's balancing-test for cases in which the basic elements of an immunity
claim were established.35
In one of the first decisions of the 1984 term, a majority of the
Court announced the dismantling of the immunity doctrine that had
been erected on the National League of Cities foundation. Justice Black-
mun, who had supplied the crucial fifth vote in National League of
Cities, abandoned that position to join with the four dissenters in the
earlier case to produce a new five-to-four majority rejecting the implied
immunity. The new majority overruled National League of Cities and
declared its acceptance of the view that the political structure of the
federal union was sufficient to enable states to protect their essential
roles under the Constitution.3 6
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 7 provided
the vehicle for the overruling of National League of Cities. In the lower
35. 452 U.S. at 288 n.29, 101 S. Ct. at 2366 n.29; see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U.S. 226, 237-38, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1061-62 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,
764 n.28, 102 S. Ct. 2126, 2140 n.28 (1982).
36. 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1018 (1985). Herbert Wechsler provided the classic statement of
this argument in an influential article published in 1954. See Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of
the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954). For more recent defenses of
this position, see J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 175-84
(1980), and La Pierre, The Political Safegurads of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental
Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 Wash. U.L.Q. 779 (1982).
37. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). The Chief Justice and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor dissented.
Justice Powell's dissent, which was joined by all four dissenters, vehemently criticized
the majority decision. He accused the majority of substantially altering the "federal system
embodied in the Constitution," id. at 1021, and of abruptly ignoring the principle of
stare decisis that should have stayed "the precipitous overruling of multiple precedents
..." Id. at 1022. Justice Powell particularly objected to the majority "mischaracterizing"
National League of Cities. On this point, he emphasized Justice Blackmun's National
League of Cities concurrence, which had concluded that the National League of Cities
result was "necessarily correct." Id. at 1025, quoting from 426 U.S. at 856, 96 S. Ct.
at 2476. After an extensive review of the constitutional history of the Tenth Amendment,
he declared that National League of Cities was "faithful to history in its understanding
of federalism," 105 S. Ct. at 1029, and that the majority was "[propounding] a view of
federalism that pays only lip service to the role of the States." Id. at 1030. He reasoned
that local transportation was just the sort of activity that the Framers of the tenth
amendment intended to leave beyond the reach of federal control, and that "[i]t isthis
law of state and local control and accountability that the Framers understood would
insure the vitality and preservation of the federal systems. ... Id. at 1032. The dissent
also observed that "[t]he Court's action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an
outright rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution . I..." d  at 1032.
Justice Rehnquist added a short dissent, lamenting the demise of National League of
Cities and predicting that its principles would eventually "again command the support of
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courts (and in the initial argument before the Supreme Court), Garcia
was one of a group of cases that raised the question of whether local
transit authorities were immune from federal regulation of the wages
and hours of their employees.38 Because the federal regulation directly
regulated the local authority and because National League of Cities itself
had held that the pay of employees was a matter of state sovereignty,3 9
the litigation focused on the third prong of the National League of
Cities test-whether public transportation was a traditional state function.
Three federal appellate courts and one state court had ruled the National
League of Cities immunity inapplicable to mass transit authorities, 40 but
the district court in Garcia reached the opposite result.
4
Faced with this split of authority, the Supreme Court noted probable
jurisdiction in Garcia.4 2 The Court did not, however, render a decision
following the initial argument. Instead, it set the case for reargument
a majority of this Court." Id. at 1033.
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, acknowl-
edged that "the emergence of an integrated and industrialized national economy" had
required the Court to reassess the role of Congress in its regulation of interstate commerce.
Id. at 1034. However, even though she admitted that the watershed Commerce Clause
decisions of the 1930's "may well have lessened the weight Congress gives to the legitimate
interests of States as States," she was unwilling to conclude "that the Supreme Court
was blind to the threat to federalism when it expanded the commerce power." Id. at
1035. She then argued that "[tihis principle requires the Court to enforce affirmative
limits on federal regulation of the States to complement the judicially crafted expansion
of the interstate commerce power." Id. at 1037. Her dissent ultimately agreed with the
decision in National League of Cities, that "[tihe proper resolution . . . lies in weighing
state autonomy as a factor in the balance when interpreting the means by which Congress
can exercise its authority on the States as States." Id. at 1037.
38. The lawsuits around the country were probably encouraged by the regulations of
the Department of Labor, which declared that publicly owned local transit authorities
were not entitled to immunity under National League of Cities. See 44 Fed. Reg. 75,630
(1979), codified as 29 C.F.R. § 775.3(b)(3) (1983).
39. 426 U.S. at 845, 96 S. Ct. at 2467.
40. See Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transp. Auth., 701 F.2d 50 (6th Cir.
1983); Alewine v. City Council, 699 F.2d 1060 (l1th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1391 (1985); Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit Auth., 677 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983); Francis v. City of Tallahassee, 424 So. 2d 61 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
41. The district court originally announced this ruling in 1981 when it granted the
transit authority's motion for summary judgment. A year later, the Supreme Court decided
Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 102 S. Ct. 1349 (1982), and remanded
Garcia to the district court for reconsideration in light of that decision. 457 U.S. 1102,
102 S. Ct. 2897 (1982). On remand, the district court adhered to its original decision and
again entered judgment for the transit authority, San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.
v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Tex. 1983); and that judgment was the one being
appealed in Garcia.
42. 104 S. Ct. 64 (1983).
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and specifically requested the parties to address the question of whether
National League of Cities should be modified or overruled. 43
Following reargument, a majority of the Court renounced the attempt
to define "traditional governmental functions" that are immune from
federal regulation. To justify that abandonment of the search for ju-
dicially enforceable standards, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion be-
gan by arguing that the lower court opinions applying National League
of Cities' "traditional governmental function" test were so discordant
that it was "difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing prin-
ciple" to harmonize the decisions. 4 Moreover, he suggested that the
discord in the lower court decisions was completely understandable for
several reasons. First, the Supreme Court itself "ha[d] made little head-
way in defining the scope of the governmental functions deemed pro-
tected under National League of Cities";41 indeed, the tax immunity
precedents from which National League of Cities was derived had also
failed to formulate a general test for identifying what governmental
functions were entitled to immunity from federal taxes.4 6 Second, prior
decision applying the National League of Cities test had recognized
that a purely historical standard provided an unworkable basis for
identifying what governmental functions were essential to the role of
states in contemporary society . 4 Third, any "nonhistorical standard for
selecting immune governmental functions [was] likely to be just as un-
workable as . . . a historical standard. '48 In short, the discordant char-
acter of the lower court decisions revealed the underlying problem-the
impossibility of the task that National League of Cities had thrust upon
the Court. According to the Garcia majority, the task was impossible
because no static definition of essential governmental functions "can be
faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic society." '49
Having rejected the National League of Cities test as "unsound in
principle and unworkable in practice,"' 0 the Garcia majority declined
to articulate any substitute. According to Justice Blackmun, "the prin-
cipal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in
the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government
itself,"" and that structure had-operated in the Urban Mass Transit
43. 104 S. Ct. 3582 (1984).
44. 105 S. Ct. at 1011.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1012-14.
47. Id. at 1014, citing Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 102 S.
Ct. 1349 (1982).
48. 105 S. Ct. at 1015.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1016.
51. Id. at 1018.
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Act52 to protect "States from the risk of having their functions in that
area handicapped by Commerce Clause regulations." 53 Because the po-
litical structure had served its purpose, the regulation of minimum wages
and overtime of state and local employees in the Fair Labor Standards
Act54 was not "destructive of state sovereignty or violative of any
constitutional provision." Thus Garcia did not require the Court "to
identify or define what affirmative limits the constitutional structure
might impose on federal action affecting the states under the Commerce
Clause.""
As a practical matter, the immediate significance of Garcia for local
governments lies in the requirement that they follow the overtime pro-
visions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The vast majority of local
employees earn more than the federal minimum wage,5 6 but many local
governments have not offered premium pay for overtime work in excess
of eight hours per day or forty hours per week. Instead, they have
offered their employees "compensatory leave" during regular duty hours
for the overtime they were required to work. Since compensatory leave
was not permissible under the federal act, many local government leaders
complained that the new rules will impose an unmanageable financial
burden on their operations. In November 1985, Congress responded to
these complaints and authorized local governments to substitute com-
pensatory leave for overtime compensation under certain circumstances. 7
From a doctrinal viewpoint, Garcia's most significant impact will
probably be to increase uncertainty about the future vitality of state
immunity doctrines. Although the majority's overruling of National Lea-
gue of Cities was unequivocal, the four dissenters were equally une-
quivocal in rejecting the view of federalism on which Garcia was based. 8
Moreover, two of the dissenters-Justices Rehnquist 9 and O'Connor 6 0-
took the unusual step of predicting that the Court would eventually
overrule Garcia and would return to the immunity principle on which
National League of Cities was based. When this inclination to reverse
is coupled with the narrowness of the Garcia majority, the immunity
doctrine may furnish yet another Burger Court example of judicial
52. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1601-1618 (1982 ed.).
53. 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 203(x) (1982 ed.).
55. 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
56. Wages above the federal minimum were certainly typical in mass transit em-
ployment. See 105 S. Ct. at 1009 n.3.
57. See Pub. L. No. 99-150, 54 U.S.L.W. 3 (Jan. 7, 1986).
58. See 105 S. Ct. at 1027-32 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and
Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.); id. at 1033-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Powell
and Rehnquist, JJ.).
59. Id. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1038 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.).
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decision-making that Justice Roberts once derided as bringing the Su-
preme Court's adjudications into "the same class as a restricted railroad
ticket, good for this day and [this] train only." 6'
If the Garcia holding does endure, it may also create additional
uncertainty in the related area of state and local immunity from federal
taxes. Justice Blackmun devoted a major portion of his majority opinion
in Garcia62 to the argument that the uncertainty of the tax immunity
doctrine on which National League of Cities had relied to fashion a
regulatory immunity justified the abandonment of the newer immunity
doctrine. It would certainly take no great leap for the Court to accept
the parallel proposition that the discord in the immunity cases showed
the unworkability of judicially administered oversight of federalism con-
flicts (and the wisdom of relying on the political structure to protect
essential state interests) in the tax context as well. Although the venerable
character of the tax immunity doctrine may deter the Court from elim-
inating it, no clear principle seems to require such a result.
In sum, the long-term significance of Garcia is impossible to predict
because it will depend on future Supreme Court decisions and, most
probably, on future decisions by a Court with new members. That means
the final word on Garcia will be determined less by logical arguments
than by the longevity of the respective justices and by political devel-
opments over which the Court itself has little direct control.
Practical Exercise of Congressional Power
Although the Garcia majority refused to articulate a constitutional
test for limiting congressional power to regulate local governments, the
constitutional boundary is not always the final word in federal-local
relations. For one thing, courts may-as two decisions of the same 1984
term that produced Garcia illustrate-be willing to find that specific
federal statutes have not extended federal power as far as the Coristi-
tution would permit. In addition, Congress itself may expressly decline
to push its powers to their full extent as it did in a recent amendment
to the antitrust laws. Taken together, these judicial and congressional
decisions illustrate the potential benefits of local governments focusing
their legal arguments on what Congress has actually done, rather than
on what Congress could do, 63 as well as the practical possibility of
61. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669, 64 S. Ct. 757, 768 (1944) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
62. See 105 S. Ct. at 1012-14.
63. Of course, local governments are not invariably successful when they rely on
statutory arguments. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 105 S.
Ct. 2771 (1985) (federal statute establishing fifty-five as mandatory retirement age for
federal fire fighters does not amount to a congressional determination that fifty-five is a
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seeking relief from unacceptable court decisions in the legislative process.
Preemption
In Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,' a
unanimous Supreme Court held that federal regulations governing the
collection of blood plasma from paid donors did not preempt more
restrictive local regulations61 that the plasma center alleged might raise
the cost of plasma collection as much as fifteen percent. 66 Although
Congress would undoubtedly have had the authority to enact (or to
authorize a federal agency to promulgate) such regulations, the Court
had little difficulty concluding that neither the various federal statutes,
covering blood and plasma nor the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
standards for plasma collection precluded the use of the traditional
police powers of local governments to regulate collection of plasma.
A 1973 statement of the federal FDA disavowed any intent to
preempt local regulations67 and. thus foreclosed any argument that the
federal regulations expressly preempted more restrictive local ordinances.
Notwithstanding the 1973 statement, the plasma center argued that the
FDA regulations preempted the field of blood regulation because of the
pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme and because of the dom-
inant federal interest in the field. In addition, the center also argued
that the Hillsborough County regulations were invalid because they
conflicted with the congressional goal of ensuring an adequate supply
of plasma.
The plasma center offered no evidence to suggest that the FDA's
1973 statement, disavowing an intent to preempt, conflicted with any
statutory obligations. Thus, its implied preemption arguments could
prevail only if it could show a change in the comprehensiveness of the
regulations or a change in the dominance of the federal interest since
the statement was issued in 1973, and the Supreme Court unanimously
concluded that it had not made such a showing.
bona fide occupational qualification for all fire fighters under the Age Discrimination
Act). Nonetheless, the cases discussed in the text aptly illustrate that that reliance on
statutory arguments can be a persuasive approach in many contexts.
64. 105 S. Ct. 2371 (1985).
65. Id. at 2373. The local ordinances imposed a $225 fee on plasma centers in the
county, required the centers to allow the county health department reasonable and con-
tinuing access to their premises and to provide information deemed relevant by the
department, required all potential donors to obtain a county identification card, imposed
additional donor testing and recordkeeping requirements, and levied a two-dollar fee on
the issuance of a donor identification card and a one-dollar fee on each plasma procedure
performed.
66. 105 S. Ct. at 2379. The district court had dismissed these estimates as "clouded
with speculation." Id.
67. Id. at 2375, citing 38 Fed. Reg. 19,365 (1973).
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Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that the federal regu-
lations had been broadened since 1973, it nonetheless concluded that
the post-1973 changes were insufficient to manifest an intent to preempt.
In explaining the basis for that conclusion, the Court's opinion em-
phasized two factors: the absence of any indication from the agency
that the new regulations affected its earlier statement and a greater
reluctance "to infer preemption from the comprehensiveness of regu-
lations than from the comprehensiveness of statutes." '68
The Court was similarly unpersuaded by the argument that the
preemption should be inferred because of the dominant federal interest
in the regulation of plasma collection. Recognizing that "every subject
that merits congressional legislation is, by definition, a subject of national
concern," Mr. Justice Marshall's opinion for the unanimous Court
emphasized that preemption of local regulations in an area was justified
only when "special features" warrant it.69 Ordinances controlling the
collection of plasma did not present any such special features because
they did not involve uniquely national matters. To the contrary, they
concerned "regulation of health and safety matters," and that type of
regulation has been, "primarily, and historically, a matter of local
concern."7°
Finally, the Court also rejected the plasma center's claim that the
Hillsborough County regulations were invalid because they conflicted
with a federal policy to ensure an adequate supply of plasma. First,
the Court noted that the plasma center had failed to persuade the district
court as to its factual claims relating to the probable impact of the
local regulations, and the Court refused to overturn the lower court's
findings as clearly erroneous. Second, the Court ruled that the plasma
center had not shown that Congress or the FDA had intended to strike
"a particular balance between safety and quantity;" thus, even if the
center had proved its claim that the regulations would reduce the supply
of plasma in Hillsborough County, it had not demonstrated any basis
for believing that the reduction would make the supply of plasma
"inadequate."'" Third, the Court emphasized that the FDA retained
authority to promulgate preemptive regulations if the dangers envisioned
by the plasma center actually materialized and that "the agency can be
expected to monitor, on a continuing basis, the effecti on the federal
program of local requirements. '7 2
68. 105 S. Ct. at 2377.
69. Id. at 2378.
70. Id.; see also id. at 2376 ("The second obstacle in [the plasma center's] path is
the presumption that state or local regulation. of matters related to health and safety is
not invalidated under the Supremacy Clause.").
71. Id. at 2379.
72. Id. The Court also rejected the center's argument that "the county ordinances
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One must be wary of attaching too much significance to the result
in Hillsborough County because the case did not involve a situation in
which the federal government was contesting local authority. Not only
had the responsible federal agency disavowed any preemptive intent
in its 1973 statement, but the federal government also filed an amicus
brief in support of the local ordinances when the case reached the
Supreme Court. Nonetheless, Hillsborough County is a welcome decision
for local governments, and the case serves as an important reminder
that local governments should not overestimate the extent to which the
federal government will supersede local authority. In Garcia," Justice
Blackmun noted that the federal political system is often sensitive to
the needs of local governments, and the federal regulations in Hills-
borough County seem to reflect that sensitivity. Moreover, the Supreme
Court's decision in Hillsborough County serves to reinforce that sen-
sitivity in two ways: (1) by reaffirming the Court's traditional reluctance
to presume a congressional intent to displace local police power regu-
lations affecting matters of health and safety and (2) by reemphasizing
the Court's disinclination to rely on regulations rather than statutes to
demonstrate preemptive intent.
Antitrust Immunity
Since the 1978 decision in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
and Light Co., 74 a local government has been immune from antitrust
liability only when the state has authorized its anticompetitive activity
''pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or
monopoly public service." ' 75 The exact scope of this partial immunity
granted to local governments has remained uncertain, but the Supreme
Court's opinions indicated that some fairly specific state involvement
would be required. City of Lafayette itself suggested, in dicta, that the
immunity attached only when the state "actively supervised" the anti-
competitive activities of the local government. 76 In addition, the 1982
conflict[ed] with the federal regulations because they prevent individuals with hepatitis
from donating their plasma" for the production of hepatitis vaccines. Because the plasma
center had never obtained a federal exemption that would allow them to collect plasma
from such donors, they lacked standing to challenge the local ordinances on this ground.
Id. at 2380.
73. 105 S. Ct. at 1017-20.
74. 435 U.S. 389, 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
75. Id. at 413, 98 S. Ct. at 1136-37 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.). The plurality
opinion in City of Lafayette did emphasize that it was not requiring the city to "point
to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" in order to qualify for antitrust immunity.
Id. at 415, 98 S. Ct. at 1138.
76. Id. at 410. 98 S. Ct. at 1135.
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decision in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder7 held
that a state constitution's grant of home rule authority was not a
sufficiently clear articulation of anticompetitve activity to immunize a
local government from antitrust liability.
The early decisions in the courts of appeals that followed Community
Communications Co. seemed sympathetic to the needs of local govern-
ments. The lower courts readily found sufficient state authorization to
confer immunity, and they also granted local governments the protections
of other antitrust defenses.7 1 Within the last year, both the Supreme
Court and Congress have manifested a similar sympathy-the Court by
affirming one of the leading decisions in the courts of appeals 79 and
Congress by passing a statute that eliminated the threat of civil damage
awards .80
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire"' was the favorable Supreme
Court decision. It affirmed a seventh circuit decision that immunized a
city from antitrust liability for its refusal to offer sewerage service to
unincorporated areas that declined to be annexed into the city. Holding
that state statutes granting the city authority to operate a sewerage
system and allowing it the option to choose whether to provide service
in unincorporated areas82 constituted a "clear articulation" of a state
policy to displace competition with regulation, the Supreme Court spe-
cifically rejected two potential limits on the partial immunity afforded
to local governments: (1) a requirement that the state legislation expressly
mention the anticompetitive conduct it sanctions and (2) a requirement
that the state actively supervise the local government's anticompetitive
activities.
In deciding whether a state statute is a "clear articulation" of a
state policy to displace competition, Town of Hallie identified the proper
test as whether anticompetitive conduct is "a foreseeable result" of the
authority that the state is conferring."3 If this foreseeability test is sat-
isfied, it is unnecessary for the state legislature "to have stated explicitly
that it expected the local government to engage in conduct that would
77. 455 U.S. 40, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982), analyzed in Murchison, Developments in the
Law, 1981-1982-Local Government Law, 43 La. L. Rev. 461, 464-68 (1982).
78. See generally Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Local Government
Law, 44 La. L. Rev. 373, 380-84 (1983).
79. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985), aff'g, 700 F.2d
376 (7th Cir. 1983). For an analysis of the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Town of Hallie,
see Murchison, supra note 78, at 381-82.
80. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750
(1984).
81. 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
82. Wis. Stat. §§ 62.18(l), 66.069(2)(c), 144.07(1) (1982 & Supp. 1984). For a brief
description of the statutes, see Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at 1717-18.
83. 105 S. Ct. at 1718-20.
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have anticompetitive effects ' 84 or to have "compelled" the local gov-
ernment to act.
85
The Wisconsin statutes constituted a clear articulation of state policy
to displace competition because anticompetitive conduct "logically would
result" from the broad authority they conferred to provide sewerage
services and to determine the areas to be served. 86 Unlike the home rule
authority held insufficient in Community Communications Co., the Wis-
consin statutes did not simply vest local governments with "general
authority . . . to govern local affairs' 87 without directly addressing the
subject matter of the regulation that was being challenged. Instead, they
specifically authorized cities to provide a particular service and "dele-
gated to the cities the express authority to take action that foreseeably
will result in anticompetitive effects." 8
Town of Hallie also rejected the argument that a local government
was entitled to antitrust immunity only when the state actively supervised
its anticompetitive activities. Although the Court has imposed such a
requirement when private parties are exercising power conferred by state
law,89 the Court described the function of that requirement as the
"essentially ... evidentiary" one of "ensuring that the [private party]
is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant to state policy." That
requirement is necessary when private parties were involved because a
private party's involvement in anticompetitive activity creates "a real
danger that he is acting to further his own interests, rather than the
governmental interests of the State." 9 By contrast, a local government's
involvement in anticompetitive activity presents "little or no danger that
[the local government] is involved in a private price-fixing arrange-
ment." 9' The "only real danger" it presents is the possibility that the
local government might seek "to further purely parochial public interests
at the expense of more overriding state goals." That interest is, however,
minimal when the local government acts "pursuant to a clearly articulated
state policy," and thus, the existence of state authorization eliminates
the need for "the State to supervise actively the [local government's]
execution of what is a properly delegated function. "92
84. Id. at 1718.
85. Id. at 1720.
86. Id. at 1718.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1719.
89. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1719 (1985);
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 100 S.
Ct. 937 (1980).
90. Southern Motor Carriers, 105 S. Ct. at 1720.
91. Id. at 1721.
92. Id.
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The favorable congressional action was passage of the Local Gov-
ernment Antitrust Act of 1984. 93 Although the new statute did not
overrule the Supreme Court decisions in City of Lafayette and Com-
munity Communications Co.,9 4 it did exempt local governments from
claims for damages under the Clayton Act. 95 The exemption extends to
both general and special function units so long as they are established
by state law 9 6 and the exemption also covers any "official or employee
[of a local government] acting in an official capacity." 97 In addition,
the statute protects private parties with respect to actions that are "di-
rected by a local government, or official or employee thereof acting in
an official capacity."9 As a practical matter, the effect of the statute
is to leave local governments subject to public enforcement remedies
and private actions for injunctive relief9 and to grant private parties
an exemption for damage claims similar to the immunity they enjoy
when acting pursuant to state regulations.""'
Congress adopted a curious compromise in defining the extent to
which the 1984 Act would apply to pending claims. The basic rule of
the statute applies the exemption to all cases commenced within thirty
days before the statute's enactment."' For cases commenced prior to
this deadline, private parties have no exemption, 12 but local governments
and their officials and employees can claim the exemption if "the court
determines, in light of all the circumstances, including the stage of
litigation and the availability of alternative relief under the Clayton Act,
that it would be inequitable not to apply this subsection to a pending
case."103
93. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984).
94. See S. Rep. No. 593, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1984).
95. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, § 3, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750
(1984).
96. Id. at § 2(I) (definition of "local government").
97. Id. at § 3(a).
98. Id. at § 4(a).
99. See S. Rep. No. 593, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1984); H. Rep. No. 965, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1984).
100. See S. Rep. No. 593, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984); H. Rep. No. 965, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1984). The immunity conferred by state regulations is, however,
somewhat broader because the Supreme Court does not require that the state compel the
actions of the private party. See Southern Motor Carriers, 105 S. Ct. at 1727-30.
101. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, §§ 3(b), 4(b), Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98
Stat. 2750 (1984). The 1985 appropriation act for the Federal Trade Commission, Pub.
L. No. 98-411, § 510, 98 Stat. 1574, prohibited that agency from using its funds to
conduct "any antitrust action against a municipality or other unit of local government"
but exempts "private antitrust actions" from that prohibition. Section 5 of the Local
Government Antitrust Act repealed that prohibition.
102. Id. at § 4(b).
103. Id. at § 3(b). See H. Conf. Rep. No. 1158, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1984).
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The actions of the Court and Congress should provide considerable
relief to local governments. Town of Hallie reflects both an increased
sensitivity to the permissibility of local governments adopting anticom-
petitive regulations when they exercise the powers of governance con-
ferred on them by state law and a willingness to allow states to delegate
their powers of governance to local units of government. Perhaps more
importantly, the 1984 statute eliminates-except for those local govern-
ments unfortunate enough to have been sued prior to the enactment of
the statute-the threat of ruinous damage awards that many observers
believed was deterring local governments from making ordinary regu-
latory decisions.'1 In light of these judicial and congressional devel-
opments, potential antitrust liability is unlikely to have dire consequences
for the ordinary operations of local governments. At most, it may prove
to be a minor irritant with respect to some decisions of local govern-
ments.
Notwithstanding the relief afforded by Town of Hallie and the 1984
statute, further congressional action in the form of an express overruling
of Community Communications Co. remains desirable. The basic error
of Community Communications Co. was its interruption of a basic trend
of local government law in the twentieth century-the use of state laws
to confer broad regulatory authority on local governments and thus to
eliminate the need for local governments to return annually to the state
legislature for authorization to undertake specific projects. The ironic
result of Community Communications Co. and Town of Hallie grants
antitrust immunity to the local government which the state requires to
obtain specific authorization for each activity it undertakes but denies
immunity to those local governments that the state has decided to trust
with a more general regulatory authority. While it may be debatable
whether broad delegations of authority are the most effective way to
implement state policies, states should be accorded the power to resolve
that debate for themselves, free from the artificial coercion of the
antitrust laws. 05 To eliminate the anomaly of current law, Congress
should recognize that the 1984 statute is only a partial and temporary
solution 0 6 and should amend the antitrust laws to extend the state action
-immunity to local governments so long as they are exercising powers
conferred on them by state law.
104. See S. Rep. No. 593, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984); H. Rep. No. 965, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. II (1984).
105. See Murchison, supra note 77, at 466-67.
106. The Senate Judiciary Committee, S. Rep. No. 593, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984),
indicated that it planned to consider more complete relief for local governments once the
damages bill had been passed. Cf. H. Rep. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984)
(although the Committee received testimony favoring broader immunity for local govern-
ments, it chose at this time to address only the issue of antitrust damage suits).
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STATE TORT LIABILITY
Introduction
Since 1977, this symposium has chronicled the efforts of the Lou-
isiana appellate courts to define the impact of the 1974 Constitution's
confirmation of earlier judicial decisions abrogating governmental tort
immunity.10 7 One of the most troublesome, and most frequently litigated,
issues has been identifying the governmental entity that is liable as the
employer of a public officer who serves within the boundaries of a local
government but is not amenable to control by the local government's
legislative authority. Much of the litigation has focused on the torts
committed by sheriff's deputies, 08 but disputes also have arisen as to
the employer of a coroner," 9 constable,"10 town marshal,"' and the clerk
of a city court." 2 Although the appellate decisions have not been entirely
consistent, the Louisiana Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements
have tended to impose liability at the local level even when it had to
stretch the traditional definition of what constitutes a governmental
entity. " 3
In addition to defining the rules of vicarious liability for the torts
of public officers, the supreme court has also tackled more general issues
relating to the standards of liability in actions against governmental
defendants. The clear trend of these decisions has been to increase the
scope of governmental liability in tort. In them, the court has ruled
that governments are subject to the "strict" liability of Article 2317 for
107. La. Const. art. XII, § 10(A): "Neither the state, a state agency, nor a political
subdivision shall be immune from suit and liability . . . for injury to person or property."
The pre-1974 decisions of the state courts are briefly summarized in Murchison, The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-77 Term-Local Government Law, 38
La. L. Rev. 462, 474 n.73 (1978).
108. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 402 So. 2d 669 (La. 1981),
analyzed in Murchison, supra note 77, at 479-83; Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789
(La. 1980), analyzed in Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Local Govern-
ment Law, 41 La. L. Rev. 483, 518-19 (1981); Foster v. Hampton, 352 So. 2d 197 (La.
1977), analyzed in Murchison, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-
1978 Term-Local Government Law, 39 La. L. Rev. 843, 871-77 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Murchison, Local Government Law-1977-19781.
109. Mullins v. State, 387 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980), analyzed in Murchison, Developments
in the Law, 1980-1981-Local Government Law, 42 La. L. Rev. 564, 585-87 (1982).
110. Hryhorchuk v. Smith, 390 So. 2d 497 (La. 1980), analyzed in Murchison, supra
note 109, at 584-87.
Ill. Honeycutt v. Town of Boyce, 327 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 341 So. 2d 327 (La. 1976), analyzed in Murchison, supra note 107, at 476-80.
112. Cosenza v. Aetna Ins. Co., 341 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), analyzed
in Murchison, supra note 107, at 477-80.
113. See Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 402 So. 2d 669, 671 (La.
1981)(sheriff is liable "in his official capacity" for torts committed by his deputies).
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"defective" things in their custody," 4 that governmental defendants can-
not be exempted from liability for paying court costs to a successful
plaintiff," 5 and that a local government can be held liable for a negligent
review of the building plans for a building that collapsed during con-
struction.'16
Finally, Louisiana courts have struggled with the question of how
judgments against governmental defendants can be enforced. The thrust
of this last group of decisions runs counter to the general theme of the
liability decisions summarized above. Although the state supreme court
did order a local government to submit to a judgment debtor examination
on one occasion," 7 it has denied writs in cases in which courts of appeal
have refused to allow the seizure of public property' 8 and declined to
issue a writ of mandamus directing a local legislative body to appropriate
funds for a tort judgment." 9
The recent expansion of tort liability has undoubtedly increased
insurance costs for local governments and, in some cases, has forced
local governments to endure periods with no insurance coverage at all.
Local officials have complained vociferously about these costs for the
past several years, and they finally got the attention of the Louisiana
Legislature this year.
In its 1985 session, the Legislature passed six separate statutes that
affect the tort liability of the state and of local governments. Act 450
provides authority for governmental defendants to satisfy personal injury
and wrongful death claims by "structured payment" plans established
pursuant to court orders or compromise agreements. 20 Act 451 transfers
liability for torts committed by public officers who serve at the local
114. See Shipp v. City of Alexandria, 395 So. 2d 727 (La. 1981); Jones v. City of
Baton Rouge, 388 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980), both analyzed in Murchison, supra note 109,
at 588-92.
115. Segura v. Louisiana Architects Selection Bd., 362 So. 2d 498 (La. 1978), analyzed
in Murchison, The Work of Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Local
Government Law, 40 La. L. Rev. 681, 712-13 (1980).
116. Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980), analyzed in Murchison, supra
note 109, at 592-95.
117. Fontenot v. State Dept. of Highways, 355 So. 2d 1324 (La. 1978), analyzed in
Murchison, Local Government Law-1977-1978, supra note 108, at 869-71.
118. Foreman v. Vermillion Parish Police Jury, 336 So. 2d 986 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 339 So. 2d 846 (La. 1976), analyzed in Murchison, supra note 107, at 475-
76.
119. Penalber v. Blount, 405 So. 2d 1378 (La. App. Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 407 So.
2d 1189 (La. 1981), analyzed in Murchison, supra note 77, at 488-89; accord, De Laureal
Eng'r, Inc. v. St. Charles Parish Police Jury, 406 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 410 So. 2d 758 (La. 1982)(substantive basis of judgment not indicated).
120. 1985 La. Acts No. 450, adding La. R.S. 13:5114 (Supp. 1986).
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level from the state to the particular subdivision the officer serves.' 2'
Act 452 limits the "general" damages that can be recovered in a tort
suit against a governmental defendant to $500,000.122 Act 453 precludes
governments and their officers and employees from incurring liability
for policy-making or discretionary acts or omissions.' 23 Act 454 confirms
governmental liability under Civil Code article 2317 for damages caused
by buildings under their control, but limits 2317 liability for other things
in the custody of governmental bodies to situations where the govern-
mental entity had notice of the defect that caused the injury., 24 Act 509
limits prejudgment interest on personal injury and wrongful death claims
against governmental defendants to six percent.'25
Framework for Analysis
The sheer volume of the 1985 legislative activity makes it difficult
to digest, much less to analyze, the new statutes. Nonetheless, at least
a preliminary analysis is required, and to provide a framework for that
analysis the discussion below focuses on three questions:
Was the legislation necessary to solve a current problem of
Louisiana law?
Will the legislation be effective in solving the problem to which
it is addressed?
Is the legislation constitutional?
This subsection will discuss the questions in a general way to provide
an overall framework for analysis, and the next subsection will ask the
questions with respect to each bill individually.
Necessity
Shortly after the 1977 decision in Foster v. Hampton, 126 the state
legislature tried to eliminate the state's liability for torts committed by
public officials who serve within local boundaries. In the 1978 session,
it enacted a statute 2 7 declaring that the state was not liable for the
121. 1985 La. Acts No. 451, § 1, adding La. R.S. 42:1441.1-1441.4 (Supp. 1986).
Section 2 of Act 451 eliminates state liability for the torts of national guardsmen that
are now covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act.
122. 1985 La. Acts No. 452, amending La. R.S. 13:5106 and La. R.S. 13:5109(A)
(Supp. 1986).
123. 1985 La. Acts No. 453, adding La. R.S. 9:2798.1 (Supp. 1986).
124. 1985 La. Acts No. 454, adding La. R.S. 9:2800 (Supp. 1986).
125. 1985 La. Acts No. 509, amending La. R.S. 13:5112 and La. R.S. 13:5117 (Supp.
1986).
126. 352 So. 2d 197 (La. 1977).
127. 1978 La. Acts No. 318, amending La. R.S. 33:1433 (1951 & Supp. 1985) and
adding La. R.S. 42:1441, analyzed in Murchison, Local Government Law-1977-1978,
supra note 108, at 878-79.
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torts of such officials or their employees. Initially, the Louisiana Supreme
Court seemed to accept this legislative reallocation of tort liability by
recognizing the possibility of holding the local official liable "in his
official capacity."' 2 However, a 1983 decision 29 diluted the significance
of the statutory abolition of direct state responsibility by holding that
public officials who served at the local level could still qualify as "state"
employees under the statute130 that indemnifies state employees who are
held personally liable for nonintentional torts committed in the scope
of their employment. A 1984 amendment 3' to the indemnity statute
overruled the specific holding of the 1983 decision. However, no statute
expressly provided what governmental entity was liable for torts com-
mitted by public officials who served within local boundaries, and so
the potential for state liability still existed when the 1985 legislative
session convened.
Officials at both the state and local levels urged modification of
the recent Louisiana decisions that have expanded the general scope of
governmental liability. In support of their plea for legislative relief from
the high costs of complying with judicially developed doctrines, advocates
of reforms that would limit the scope of governmental tort liability
frequently emphasized three concerns. First, they argued that imposing
liability under article 2317 without requiring the governmental body with
custody over the thing to have knowledge of the defect created an
unacceptable risk of liability, particularly with respect to streets, roads,
and highways. Second, they raised the specter of governments facing
huge judgments that could be satisfied only by reducing essential gov-
ernmental services. Third, they suggested that the Louisiana Supreme
Court's refusal to endorse the public duty doctrine might discourage
local governments from adopting needed police power regulations.
The Legislature seems to have been convinced by the arguments that
identified article 2317 liability, large judgments, and the lack of the
public duty doctrine as the culprits in increasing the tort liability costs
of Louisiana's governmental entities. But one can certainly question
whether the real problems have been accurately identified. Although
article 2317 undoubtedly provides a common basis for claims against
local governments, 32 it is ordinarily an alternate basis to a conventional
negligence claim under article 2315. In many-perhaps most-cases that
128. Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 402 So. 2d 669 (La. 1981).
129. Diaz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d 699 (La. 1983), analyzed in Murchison,
Developments in the Law, 1983-1984-Local Government Law, 45 La. L. Rev. 357, 393
(1984).
130. La. R.S. 13:5108.2 (1982).
131. 1984 La. Acts No. 923.
132. Darensbourg, Addressing the Municipal Liability Problem in Louisiana, La. Mun.
Rev. 5 (Mar. - Apr. 1985).
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have imposed liability against local governments under 2317 the courts
might also have held the government liable under 2315 as well.' Sim-
ilarly, the practical possibility that a large judgment could bankrupt a
local government or force it to curtail essential services seems relatively
small in light of the decisions that refuse to approve seizure or mandamus
as methods for enforcing tort judgments against local governments.'34
Finally, the only case holding a local government liable for the negligent
performance of a general regulatory responsibility' relied on duties
established in the local government's own building code. The point of
these reservations is not to suggest that the expanding tort liability of
local governments should be ignored, but to emphasize the need for
careful and accurate identification of the problem before meaningful
legislative solutions can be drafted.
Effectiveness
One can only evaluate the effectiveness of the Legislature's response
to the problems associated with governmental tort liability by individual
analysis of each of the statutes that it passed, and that analysis is
performed in the subsection below. At this point, it should suffice to
emphasize that the statutes are only effective to the extent that they
solve, or at least ameliorate, one or more of the problems that prompted
the legislature to act.
Constitutionality
In Louisiana, constitutional attacks on legislative modifications to
governmental tort liability can be premised on either the state or the
federal constitution. Because the state claims appear more substantial,
this discussion will concentrate on them and will merely outline the
potential federal claims.
Whether phrased as a denial of due process3 6 or of equal protec-
tion, 117 the analytical framework for the federal constitutional issue is
133. See Malone, Ruminations on Liability for Acts of Things, 42 La. L. Rev. 979,
1003 (1982)(suggesting that "a commitment to an affirmative requirement of reasonable
care in the maintenance of public highways would have led to a recovery in most of the
instances in which the drain, curb, or paving was branded as a 'defective thing'); cf.
Murchison, supra note 77, at 485 (describing the 2317 decisions as "using the defect issue
to reestablish a negligence-type standard that holds local governments liable under article
2317 only when they have failed to take all reasonable steps to minimize the dangers
associated with carrying out their essential responsbilities").
134. Foreman v. Vermillion Parish Police Jury, 336 So. 2d 986 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 339 So. 2d 846 (La. 1976).
135. Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980).
136. U.S. Const. amend, XIV, § 1: "No state shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .. "
137. Id.: "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
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the same. None of the statutes adversely affect a suspect class or interfere
with a fundamental right,' and thus the courts will sustain the statutes
unless they bear no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.,3 9
Under this standard, all of the statutes should survive federal scrutiny
with relatively little difficulty, inasmuch as all of them, at a minimum,
bear a rational relationship to the legitimate state interest of conserving
the public fisc to enable states and localities to provide essential public
services.
Like most other states, Louisiana also has guarantees of due process"'
and equal protection 4 ' in its state constitution. Moreover, the decisions
of the Louisiana Supreme Court make it clear that Louisiana's inter-
pretations of the state constitution will not necessarily follow the United
States Supreme Court's interpretations of analogous federal provisions,'4 2
and recent Louisiana decisions apply stricter standards than the federal
tests with respect to both due process and equal protection claims.
On substantive due process claims, Louisiana never retreated to the
rational relationship test that has characterized modern federal review
of economic and social legislation.'43 Instead, the Louisiana Supreme
138. One might argue that limitations on tort recovery affect the fundamental right
to recover for economic losses that an individual has suffered, but that argument is
persuasive only when the Legislature changes the liability rules applicable to injuries that
preceded the legislation. When the Legislature acts prospectively (as it did in all the
statutes discussed in the text), it is exercising its power to define what injuries give rise
to legally cognizable losses. Thus, the right to recover of one who suffers an injury after
the passage of the legislation never attaches because he has not suffered a loss for which
the law authorizes compensation.
139. See, e.g., Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149 (La.), rev'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 477 So. 2d 1094 (1985).
140. La. Const. art. i, § 2: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
except by due process of law."
141. Id., art. I, § 3:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or
affilations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate
against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or
political ideas or affiliations.
142. State court divergence from Supreme Court interpretations of federal constitutional
provisions has become increasingly common in recent years. See, e.g., Howard, State
Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 60 Va. L. Rev. 873
(1976); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L.
Rev. 329 (1980). At least one justice of the United States Supreme Court has encouraged
state courts to show such independence. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection
of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977).
143. The modern emphasis on federal constitutional law has obscured the extent to
which substantive due process endured in most states. See generally Hetherington, State
Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 13, 22
(1958); Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 Minn. L.
Rev. 91 (1950).
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Court has consistently applied a less deferential test that asks whether
the challenged statute is "reasonably" designed to further a valid state
purpose.'" The exact extent that this reasonableness test differs from
the federal standard is difficult to quantify. The Louisiana courts do,
however, require the governmental body to demonstrate a realistic factual
basis for believing the statute will accomplish the purpose for which it
was designed, and they have invalidated statutes when the government
was unable to establish such a basis. 45
In recent years, the Louisiana Supreme Court has also employed a
reasonableness standard on some equal protection claims, 46 but it did
not develop a theoretical rationale for that approach until the rehearing
decision in Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 47 which was issued in Sep-
144. Cf. La. Const. art. I, § 4: "Every person has the right to acquire, own, control,
use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable
statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power." (emphasis added).
145. See, e.g., City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 So. 2d 1078, 1081-83 (La. 1978); Hi-
Lo Oil Co. v. City of Crowley, 274 So. 2d 757, 762-66 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
277 So. 2d 673 (La. 1973).
146. See, e.g., Detraz v. Fontana, 416 So. 2d 1291 (La. 1982) (invalidating a statute
requiring that a bond for attorney fees be posted in any suit against a public official).
147. 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985). Only three members of the court, Chief Justice
Dixon and Justices Dennis and Lemmon, joined without reservation in the Sibley opinion
issued after rehearing. Justices Marcus and Blanche dissented without opinion, and Justices
Watson and Calogero filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Justice Watson concurred with the majority's opinion that the Medical Malpractice
Act, La. R.S. 40:1299.39 (Supp. 1985), did not limit the damages recoverable from state
hospital boards for their own independent negligence, but issued a "vigorous dissent" to
the majority's equal protection argument. He thought it an inappropriate "derogation of
legislative power" for the court to abandon the federal three-tier equal protection analysis
when the equal protection issue was rendered moot by Act 239 of 1985, which allowed
victims of state-employed health care provider tortfeasors to recover full medical expenses.
"The newly discovered requirement that the state justify its legislation in court is an
unwarranted invasion of matters best left to resolution in the halls of the legislature."477
So. 2d at 1110.
Justice Calogero also concurred in part and dissented in part, but on each issue he
took a position in direct opposition to the one advocated by Justice Watson. Justice
Calogero objected to the portion of the judgment remanding the case to the court of
appeal for a determination of the board's independent negligence for two reasons: (1)
because he could find in the record no specific allegation of the board's primary negligence,
and (2) because he could not accept any theory of "corporate negligence" upon which
the board's liability would be premised. After a discussion of the history of "corporate
negligence" liability as a response to the charitable immunity doctrine, he concluded that
"there is no indication that there is a corporate body or political subdivision capable of
suing and being sued which operated the LSU Medical Center in Shreveport." Id. at
I 11. On the other hand, Justice Calogero agreed with the majority's distinction between
federal and state standards for equal protection analysis, on the ground that "the Louisiana
equal protection clause is separate and distinct from its federal counterpart, .... " Id. at
1112. He also agreed that the case should be remanded for legal arguments and the
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tember, 1985. Sibley involved a constitutional challenge to the statute
limiting the state's liability for malpractice by health professionals under
its control. 41 On original hearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court applied
the minimum rationality approach of federal equal protection law and
sustained the statute. On rehearing, it modified its judgment by holding
that the federal approach to equal protection was "not an appropriate
model for interpreting and applying the protection of equal laws pledged
in ... [the] ... state constitution."'' 49 It then remanded the case to
the district court so that state would have the opportunity to demonstrate
that the statute satisfied this new state standard.
After a vigorous criticism of the three-tiered analysis characteristic
of recent federal law, Justice Dennis' majority opinion in Sibley con-
cluded that state equal protection claims should be governed by an
alternate approach drawn directly from the text of the 1974 Constitution.
Relying on the two explanatory sentences that follow the general ban
against denying any person the equal protection of the laws, Justice
Dennis declared that they establish a distinct three-tiered analysis for
state law claims. First, the state constitution absolutely bars laws that
classify individuals on the basis of race or of religious ideas, beliefs,
or affiliations. Second, the constitution forbids "arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable" laws that rely on "birth, age, sex, culture, physical
condition, or political ideas or associations" as the basis for statutory
classification. When a statute classifies individuals on the basis of one
of those characteristics, the state must demonstrate the reasonableness
of the legislative classification. 50 Third, a statute that uses any other
basis of classification is constitutional unless the person attacking the
statute can show that the statutory classification scheme "does not
suitably further any appropriate state interest."''
The full impact of this new equal protection doctrine will obviously
depend on its future application, but Sibley itself suggests that the
Louisiana Supreme Court will prefer the second level "reasonableness"
scrutiny whenever possible. Because the state had not had an opportunity
to justify its statute under the Sibley framework, the court declined to
render a final judgment with respect to the specific statute before it.
presentation of evidence on the issue and a determihation by the trial court as to whether
the liability limitation could be found to "reasonably further a legitimate state purpose."
Id.
148. La. R.S. 40:1299.39 (1985). While the case was pending in the Louisiana Supreme
Court, the Legislature amended the statute to exclude "all reasonable medical, surgical,
hospitalization, physical rehabilitation, and custodial services" from the limitation on
damages.
149. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1106.
150. Id. at 1107 (footnote omitted).
151. Id. at 1107-08.
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It did, however, hold that the reasonableness review applied to the
statute limiting the size of medical malpractice awards because it was
a law that "classifie[d] individuals" on the basis of "their physical
condition. ''12
Even if the 1985 statutes survive constitutional challenges based on
the state guarantees of due process and equal protection, they may face
an even more substantial hurdle in the waiver of governmental immunity
found in article XII, section 10 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution.,"
In at least two decisions, the Louisiana Supreme Court has indicated
that this constitutional provision requires that governments be limited
to the substantive defenses that would be available to private party
defendants in similar circumstances. Segura v. Louisiana Architects Se-
lection Board'14 held that the statute relieving the state of liability for
most court costs violated the constitutional waiver because it exempted
the state from liability for a part of the liability (i.e., court costs) that
a private party would have to bear. Similarly, Jones v. City of Baton
Rouge'55  termed the constitutional waiver of tort immunity
"unequivocal' ' 5 6 in refusing to consider the "chaotic results" that the
defendant argued would result if 2317 liability were extended to gov-
ernmental bodies.
Notwithstanding these decisions, the Legislature undoubtedly retains
considerable control over the tort liability of local governments. In the
first place, the constitutional provision does not appear to be designed
to freeze the substantive rules of liability into their 1974 form. Thus,
the waiver of governmental immunity should present no obstacle to the
creation of new substantive defenses so long as the Legislature changes
152. Id. at 1108.
The law on its face is designed to impose different burdens on different
classes of persons according to the magnitude of damage to their physical
condition. The statute creates two classes: one, a group Qf malpractice victims
each of whom has suffered damage that would oblige a defendant under our
basic law to repair it by paying in excess of 500,000 dollars; another, a class
consisting of victims whose damages would not require an award over this
amount to make individual reparation. Victims in the former class are prevented
from recovering for all their damage, while those in the latter class are allowed
full recovery. Damage to the physical condition of each malpractice victim is
the primary element of his damage and a primary cause of his being assigned
to one of the two classes. Thus, the statutory classification disadvantages or
discriminates against one class of individuals by reason of or because of their
physical condition.
Id. at 1108-09.
153. See supra note 107.
154. 362 So. 2d 498 (La. 1978).
155. 388 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980).
156. Id. at 740.
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the liability rules for all defendants and not merely for governmental
defendants.'57
Beyond this general power to alter substantive tort law, the court
might also be persuaded to accept at least two other theories that would
provide the Legislature with even greater control over the tort liability
of local governments. First, the court may be willing to treat the con-
stitutional provision as inapplicable with respect to uniquely governmental
activities.' Because the constitutional provision only requires that the
government's liability be the same as that of similarly situated private
defendants, the court might treat it as irrelevant to the problem of
establishing liability rules for activities that are the exclusive province
of governmental bodies. Second, the Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion
following the original hearing in Sibley suggested another possible ex-
ception to the waiver provision. Emphasizing the "limited" scope of
the constitutional waiver, 5 9 the court indicated that the 1974 Louisiana
Constitution permits the Legislature to place a ceiling on the amount
of damages that can be awarded against governmental defendants so
long as it does not alter the substantive rules of liability. 60 Unfortunately,
the present status of this potential exception remains ambiguous because
the rehearing opinion in Sibley concluded that a 1984 amendment to
the statute being challenged had mooted the waiver of immunity ar-
gument. 161
Finally, the constitution's waiver of immunity expressly grants the
Legislature authority to establish the procedures for filing suit against
the state and its political subdivisions as well as to provide the "effect"
of judgments against governmental defendants. 62 However, it qualifies
157. Cf. Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985) (indicating that
legislative limitation on damages that could be awarded in medical malpractice actions
against the state did not violate the waiver of immunity when the damage limit was
identical to the limit in actions against private defendants).
158. See generally Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change,
1966 U. Ill. L.F. 919, 922-23.
159. Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149 (La.), rev'd on other grounds
on rehearing, 477 So. 2d 1094 (1985).
160. 462 So. 2d at 154: "[W]e simply find no basis to support plaintiff's contention
that the Louisiana Constitution by denying the state immunity from suit in contract or
tort or for injury to person or property, prohibits the legislature limiting in any respect
recoverable tort damages."
161. 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985).
162. La. Const. art. XII, § 10(C):
The legislature shall provide a procedure for suits against the state, a state
agency, or a political subdivision. It shall provide for the effect of a judgment,
but no public property or public funds shall be subject to seizure. No judgment
against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision shall be exigible,
payable, or paid except from funds appropriated therefor by the legislature or
by the political subdivision against which judgment is rendered.
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this last grant of authority by providing that judgments may only be
paid out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the governmental
defendant. As a practical matter, this textual proviso-when combined
with the state supreme court's reluctance to create a judicial method of
enforcement' 63-would seem to give the Legislature (or the local legis-
lative body) the unilateral power to limit the size of the judgments it
will pay.
The next subsection briefly analyzes the constitutionality of
each of the 1985 statutes. The discussion evaluates each statute in
terms of challenges that might be based on two state-law grounds: the
equal protection clause or the waiver of governmental immunity. It
provides no individual review of potential federal challenges because the
state claims are always the more substantial. Similarly, it bypasses in-
dividual analysis of possible state due process claims because of the
similarity of that review with the new state equal protection standard
and because Sibley indicates that the Louisiana Supreme Court is pres-
ently inclined to evaluate limitations of tort liability in equal protection
terms.
Application of the Analytic Framework
Act 450
The problem to which Act 450 is addressed appears to be the
potentially catastrophic impact of the huge judgments now facing state
and local governments as a result of recent judicial decisions extending
the scope of governmental tort liability. The Act provides express
authority' 64 for the state and for local governments 61 to negotiate set-
tlements that use "structured payment plans"'' 66 to pay for future medical
163. See, e.g., Penalber v. Blount, 405 So. 2d 1378 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied,
407 So. 2d 1189 (La. 1981); Foreman v. Vermillion Parish Police Jury, 336 So. 2d 986
(La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 So. 2d 846 (La. 1976), both discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 118-119.
164. 1985 La. Acts No. 450, adding La. R.S. 13:5114(B)(1),(C)(F) (Supp. 1986).
165. The statute applies to suits and claims against public entities, and it defines
"public entity" to include "the state and any of its branches, departments, offices,
agencies[,] boards, commissions, instrumentalities, officers, officials, employees, and po-
litical subdivisions and the departments, offices, agencies, boards, commissions, instru-
mentalities, officers, officials, and employees of such political subdivisions." La. R.S.
13:5114(B)(2) (Supp. 1986), as added by 1985 La. Acts No. 450, § 1.
166. The Act defines a "structured payment plan" as:
a method by which the public entity held liable for damages, or the public
entity which agrees to compromise a cause of action for damages, is held
responsible. The plan may include immediate payments and the funding of an
investment, the principal and fruits of which are to be used to pay in future
years damages in accordance with the terms of the plan. Such payments may
include, but shall not be limited to, cash payments, annuities, trusts, reversionary
medical trusts, qualified assets as defined by Section 130 of the United States
Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 130), or any combination of them.
La. R.S. 13:5114(B)(1).(Supp. 1986).
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expenses and economic losses. 67 In addition, it also authorizes the trial
judge to order that a structured payment plan be used to satisfy medical
expenses and economic losses that accrue after the entry of judgment.' 61
Structured payment plans can reduce the cost of large tort judgments
in at least two ways. In the first place, they limit the government's
liability to those losses that actually occur. To the extent that trial
estimates tend to exceed the actual costs of future damages, a structured
payment plan relieves the defendant of liability for those expenses.' 69 In
addition, structured payment plans can have favorable tax consequences
that reduce the cost to the defendant even as they increase the actual
benefits received by the injured party. Personal injury awards do not
constitute "income" as that term is used in the Internal Revenue Code, 70
but the code contains no similar exemption for future earnings on a
tort recovery. As a result, a tax-free annual payment under a structured
payment plan may provide more disposable funds to an injured party
than a larger taxable return on a lump-sum settlement or judgment.
Despite the potential cost savings in structured payment plans, one
may reasonably conclude that Act 450 will have only a limited effect
on governmental tort liability. Most obviously, the potential for signif-
icant cost savings applies only to large claims in which future medical
expenses and economic loss are likely to be extensive. Futhermore, the
statute's impact even on large claims may be relatively modest for two
reasons. First, the effect of the express provision of settlement authority
may not change the status quo very much because the existing authority
of both local governments and state agencies probably permitted settle-
ments that incorporated structured settlement plans. Moreover, the new
act limited its provision for funding of structured payments plans on
Joint Budget Committee approval without a special appropriation act
to plans adopted to satisfy judgments; 7' settlement offers remain subject
167. The Act permits structured payment plans for "economic damages," which it
defines as "losses or damages anticipated to be incurred subsequent to judgment, for
medical expenses, attendant care, lost earnings, impairment of earning capacity, cost of
replacement services, and similar losses or damages which are considered items of special,
as opposed to general, damages." La. R.S. 13:5114(B)(3) (Supp. 1986).
168. La. R.S. 13:5114(D) (Supp. 1986).
169. On the other hand, the defendant is liable only for those future damages that
the plan covers, See, e.g., La. R.S. 13:5114(D)(1) (Supp. 1986)
(in ordering a structured payment plan, judge must make "specific factual
findings as to the undiscounted dollar value of each item of future economic
damage in terms of the dollar amount of future periodic payments to be made
as compensation as of the time of payment, the interval of time between such
payments, the period of time over which the payments are to be made, and
the inflationary factor for such period of time").
170. I.R.C. § 461 (1984).
171. La. R.S. 13:5114(E) (Supp. 1986), as added by 1985 La. Acts No. 450, § 1.
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to "legislative review and appropriation."'' 2 Second, the extent to which
judges will order structured payment plans when the parties have been
unable to agree on a plan remains uncertain. If Louisiana's trial judges
prove reluctant to force the plans on unwilling parties, the Act's ultimate
impact may remain quite limited.
Louisiana courts will probably hold Act 450 constitutional. To the
extent that statute authorizes consensual arrangements of structured pay-
ment plans, it presents no significant constitutional problems. Further-
more, the potential constitutional attacks will probably not prove fatal
even if an injured party is forced to accept a structured payment plan
for future damages. Although the courts might judge a state equal
protection challenge by the "reasonableness" standard recognized in
Sibley,' 71 the legitimate need to conserve current funds to pay for other
public services designed to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
the community provides a reasonable justification for delaying the pay-
ment of future damages until they actually occur. In addition, the courts
could rely on either of two rationales to reject the argument that Act
450 violates the state constitution's waiver of governmental immunity:
accepting the "damages" exception announced in the original hearing
in Sibley'14 or relying on the constitution's express proviso that the
Legislature can prescribe the "effect" of judgments against governmental
defendants. '71
Act 451
Act 451 focuses on a relatively narrow problem, albeit one that has gen-
erated a sizeable amount of litigation in recent years: the potential for state
liability for the torts of certain public officials and their deputies. Although
earlier statutes had generally succeeded in overruling specific decisions with
which the Legislature was dissatisfied, they had not dislodged a majority of
the Louisiana Supreme Court from its general position that the state could
be held liable for the torts of local officials who were not subject to the con-
trol of the legislative body in the political subdivision in which they served.
Thus, a general statutory definition of the standards of vicarious liability for
these officials remained desirable.
The 1985 statute seems to be an effective response to the problem
to which it is addressed because it attempts to establish a comprehensive
172. La. R.S. 13:5114(C) (Supp. 1986).
173. As in Sibley, the court might treat this as a classification based on "physical
condition" because it treats those injured parties with substantial future damages differently
from those whose damages have already occurred. See supra note 152 and accompanying
text.
174. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
175. La. Const. art. XII, § 10(C); see supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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theory of vicarious liability for the torts of local officials and those
who work for them. Although it begins with an unequivocal disavowal
of state liability for the torts of these local officals, it does not stop
there but goes on to provide affirmative standards as well. On the one
hand, it expressly requires constitutional officers to obtain liability in-
surance covering themselves and their assistants "in amounts of not less
than twenty thousand dollars per injured person.' ' 6 In addition, it
establishes the following criteria for determining what governmental
entity is to be liable for the torts of a particular "public officer:" ' 77
The territorial jurisdiction and ...extent of the governmental
body politic [that] elects [the officer] or the [individual with
authority to appoint the officer] ...
The source of the funds used for the operating expenses of [the]
office .. . in which [the] officer serves.
The office of the individual who has the right to control closely
the daily time and physical activities of the officer. 178
In general, the legislative solution seems consistent with effective
risk management because it transfers liability to the local official with
the ability to control the officer and thus to encourage safer performance
of public responsibilities. Unfortunately, however, the requirement of a
liability insurance requirement of only $20,000 per person seems com-
pletely inadequate to cover the cost of serious injuries. In such situations,
the courts might again be forced to define what "governmental entity'1 t79
is responsible for the uninsured loss and some language in the statute
176. La. R.S. 42:1441.2(B) (Supp. 1986), as added by 1985 La. Acts No. 451, § 1.
177. The statute carefully distinguishes a "public officer" from a "state officer:"
As provided in R.S. 42:1, the term "public officer" includes anyone who holds
any elective or appointive office created by constitution or law. The term is
not synonymous with state officer, as "public officer" includes not only public
officers of the state but also public officers of parishes, municipalities, special
districts, and other political subdivisions. While all offices created by the con-
stitution or law are "public offices," they are not all "state offices," as they
include parish offices' municipal offices, district offices, and offices of political
subdivisions.
La. R.S. 13:1441.3(C) (Supp. 1986).
178. La. R.S. 13:1441.3(B) (Supp. 1986).
179. Traditionally, "public offices" like that of the sheriff were not regarded as
governmental entities, see Murchison, Local Government Law-1977-1978, supra note 108,
at 871; but see Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 402 So, 2d 669, 671 (La.
1981) (allowing suit by the sheriff "in his official capacity"). As a practical matter, this
decision may recognize the sheriff as a governmental entity for tort liability purposes.
See Murchison, supra note 77, at 479-83. Cf. La. R.S. 42:1441.2(B) (Supp. 1986), as
added by 1985 La. Acts No. 451, § I (constitutional officers are deemed "local govern-
mental subdvision[s]" for the purpose of "being able to form new interlocal risk man-
agement programs or to join existing ones").
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suggests that the parish police jury or similar governing body might be
the appropriate body to bear the loss. 80 That result seems particularly
undesirable inasmuch as the local legislative body has even less ability
to control constitutional officers than the Legislature has and it also
has fewer resources from which to pay large judgments.
Act 451 should survive a constitutional challenge because the statute
does not classify on the basis of any of the characteristics listed in the
state constitution.' 8 ' Thus, the courts will sustain it against an equal
protection attack unless the plaintiff can prove that the statutory clas-
sification fails to serve any appropriate state interest. Judged by this
minimal standard, the Legislature's desire to transfer tort liability to
the office that controls an official's performance should qualify as such
an appropriate state interest. Likewise, the statute should survive a
constitutional attack based on the waiver of immunity provision so long
as it is construed as a transfer of liability from one governmental entity
to another rather than an attempt to insulate all governmental entities
from liability. 182
Act 452
Like Act 450, Act 452 is apparently designed to reduce the cost of
large judgments that might require cutbacks in essential governmental
services. It imposes a very modest ceiling on the amount of damages
that can be awarded against governmental defendants in personal injury
or wrongful death actions. The dollar amount of the ceiling is $500,000;
but it only applies to damages "exclusive of medical care and related
benefits and loss of earnings, and loss of future earnings,"', 83 and it
covers only judgments, not settlements. 84 Moreover, the statute broadly
180. La. R.S. 42:1441.3(C) (Supp. 1986), as added by 1985 La. Acts No. 451:
A public officer may be the officer of a parish, municipality, district, or other
political subdivision without being appointed by or under the direct control of
the particular body which exercises the legislative functions of such parish,
municipality, district, or political subdivision, in much the same manner as a
public officer of the state may hold an office in the executive branch or may
hold the office of a state court judgeship without being appointed by or under
the direct control of the legislature.
181. La. Const. art. I, § 3; see supra notes 137, 149-51 and accompanying text.
182. See Murchison, supra note 77, at 482-83. The statute itself disavows any intent
to reestablish "any governmental immunity based on the status of sovereignty of any
government;" instead, it claims that its purpose is "to correct the legislatively created
substantive law" that the Louisiana Supreme Court had misconstrued in its recent decisions.
183. La. R.S. 13:5106(B)(1), (2) (Supp. 1986), as added by 1985 La. Acts No. 452,
§ 1.
184. La. R.S. 13:5109(A) (Supp. 1986). Before the Department of Transportation can
settle any claim for more than the amount allowed for judgments, it must secure the
concurrence of the Attorney General. Id.
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defines loss of earnings to include "any form of economic loss which
the claimant will sustain after the trial as a result of the injury or death
which forms the basis of the claim." 85
As a practical matter, Act 452 will have only a marginal impact on
the tort liability of local governments and the state. In effect, the statute
limits the pain and suffering component of a tort judgment, but not a
settlement offer, to $500,000, and the number of judgments of this size
is probably quite small. Of course, a single judgment of this magnitude
could bankrupt many local governments, but the reduction of the single
item of pain and suffering is unlikely to bring the judgment within the
local government's ability to pay. Furthermore, the existing law of
Louisiana would not have forced the local government to pay the judg-
ment in lieu of providing essential governmental services.
Because of the narrow scope of the damages limit that Act 452
imposes, several years may elapse before Louisiana's appellate courts
have to consider the constitutionality of the statute. If such a challenge
does arise, recent decisions make its outcome uncertain.
In evaluating an equal protection challenge to Act 452, the Louisiana
Supreme Court will probably use a reasonableness standard. The court
would likely find that this statute-like the statute limiting malpractice
damages' 86-classifies individuals on the basis of their physical condition
because it treats severely injured plaintiffs differently from other injured
parties who can recover the full loss associated with their pain and
suffering. The governmental defendant would undoubtedly argue that
the limit was related to conserving public fisc and to protecting gov-
ernmental bodies from the catastrophic impact of extremely large judg-
ments. The court might, however, conclude that the statutory limit was
not reasonably related to either of those purposes because of its extremely
narrow scope and because a governmental defendant facing a tort judg-
ment in an unmanageable amount has no duty to use its funds to pay
the judgment before providing needed or desirable governmental services.
The outcome of a challenge based on the constitution's waiver of
governmental immunity is similarly problematic. If the court adheres to
the "damages" exception announced in the opinion following the original
hearing in Sibley, Act 452 would seem to fall within the exception.
However, as noted above, 87 the extent to which this portion of the
original Sibley opinion survives the rehearing decisions remains unclear.
Act 453
Act 453 eliminates liability for policy-making or discretionary acts,
and, surprisingly, it generated relatively little public attention during the
185. La. R.S. 13:5106(D)(2) (Supp. 1986).
186. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
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legislative session. As a result, one can only guess as to the reasons
that prompted the Legislature to pass it. Most likely, it was a response
to the Louisiana Supreme Court's refusal to embrace the public duty
doctrine in Stewart v. Schmieder.'88 By freeing governmental entities and
public officials and employees from the threat of tort liability for er-
roneous policy judgments, the Legislature presumably hoped that those
officials and employees would be willing to undertake controversial
actions that fell within their responsibilities.
The partial immunity conferred by Act 453 is likely to have limited
effect in curbing the liability of local governments and their officers
and employees. Its extension of its protections to officials and employees
is commendable in light of the undeveloped character of Louisiana law
with respect to official immunity.' 89 However, the scope of the immunity
it confers remains unclear, and it would probably not change the result
in the particular case in which the Louisiana Supreme Court appeared
to reject the public duty doctrine.
The source of the uncertainty regarding the scope of the immunity
conferred by Act 453 is two-fold. First, the "policy-making and dis-
cretionary function" language of the Act has generated considerable
confusion in decisions construing similar wording in federal' 90 and state' 9'
statutes. Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court should have relatively little
difficulty in narrowly construing the statute if it remains committed to
the expansive approach to tort liability that it has manifested in the
recent past. Second, the Louisiana statute itself contains two exceptions-
one for "acts or omissions not reasonably related to the legitimate
governmental objective for which the policy-making or discretionary
188. 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980).
189. See, e.g., Hryhorchuk v. Smith, 390 So. 2d 497, 504 (La. 1980) (constable who
was negligent in performing the duties of his office is not entitled to indemnity from the
state); Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So. 2d 969 (La. 1977) (police officer personally
liable for use of excessive force); cf. Gordon v. City of New Orleans, 363 So. 2d 235,
242 (La. App. 4th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 371 So. 2d 768 (La. 1979) (Judge Redmann
argued in a dissenting opinion in the court of appeal that the court should imply such
an indemnity right for police officer acting within the course and scope of his employment).
But see Foster v. Powdrill, 463 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985) (limited immunity
of a district attorney).
190. Compare, e.g., United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984) with
McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1985) and Jablonski by Pahlo v.
United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983).
191. See generally Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352
(1968) (state liable for assault against foster parent by child placed in her custody by
state youth authority): Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts § 8950, comment d
("The expression, discretionary function, is clearly a standard, requiring measured judgment
in its application, and its meaning cannot be reduced to a set of specific rules."); compare
Urethane Specialties, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 620 P.2d 683 (Alaska 1980) with Morris v.
Oregon State Transp. Comm'n, 38 Or. App. 331, 590 P.2d 260 (Or. App. 1979).
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power exists"'' 9 2 and the other for "criminal, fraudulent, malicious,
intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct."'' 93 Just
as a narrow defintion of the general terms could limit the statute's
impact, so also could a broad definition of either or both of these
exceptions significantly mitigate its effect.
In Stewart, the Louisiana Supreme Court held the city of Baton
Rouge liable for its negligent inspection of a building being constructed
by private parties. Although Act 453 might protect a local government
from liability for failure to establish an inspection program, it would
probably not alter the result in Stewart. The duty breached in Stewart
was not a policy decision as to what level of inspection was desirable,
but a failure to conduct the review and inspection that the city's own
building code indicated that it would perform. As noted in an earlier
analysis of Stewart, 94 the best way to control the liability exposure that
Stewart creates is to review the local ordinances with a view to deleting
those provisions that impose obligations that the local government does
not actually carry out.
The constitutionality of Act 453 is uncertain. The Louisiana Supreme
Court should reject an equal protection challenge to the act. Because
the statutory classification does not appear to be based on any of the
categories specifically listed in article 1, section 3 of the state constitution,
the court would probably require the plaintiff to prove that the clas-
sification scheme did not further any appropriate state interest.' 95 In
light of that deferential standard, the encouragement that the statute
provides to the exercise of regulatory responsibilities should provide an
adequate justification. By contrast, a challenge based on the waiver of
governmental immunity would be more substantial. Because the statute
gives governmental defendants a new defense, it would violate Segura
and Jones unless the court was willing to accept one of the following
arguments: (1) that the inclusion of officers and employees made it a
general change in substantive liability applicable to all defendants 96 or
(2) that policy-making and discretionary actions involve uniquely gov-
ernmental functions that are implicitly excepted from the constitutional
prohibition. 97
Act 454
Act 454 attempts to reduce, not the amount of damages, but the
number of claims that governmental defendants now face. It limits "strict
192. La. R.S. 9:2798.1(C)(1) (Supp. 1986), as added by 1985 La. Acts No. 453,, § I.
193. La. R.S. 9:2798.1(C)(2) (Supp. 1986).
194. Murchison, supra note 109, at 592-95.
195. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
196. See supra text accompanying note 157.
197. See supra text accompanying note 158.
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liability" claims against governmental defendants by reversing, for most
situations, the recent decisions that allow governmental defendants to
be held liable under Louisiana Civil Code article 2317 for property in
their custody regardless of whether they knew or should have known
of the "defect" that caused the injury. The Act confirms the applicability
of the normal 2317 rules for defective buildings in the custody of
governmental bodies. 9 However, it limits governmental liability for other
claims "based solely upon" article 2317 to those cases in which "the
public entity had actual or constructive notice of the particular vice or
defect which caused the damage prior to the occurrence" and where
"the public entity has had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the defect
and has failed to do so."' 99 Moreover, the statute narrowly defines
"constructive notice" as "the existence of facts which infer actual knowl-
edge."00
Act 454 may not be as effective in limiting the scope of governmental
tort liability as its sponsors hope. For one thing, the retention of normal
2317 rules for buildings may still expose governmental bodies to a fair
number of strict liability claims. In addition, the Louisiana Supreme
Court may choose to confine the statute's impact by narrowly construing
two parts of the statutory language: (1) the provision that the exception
to 2317 liability applies only to cases "based solely upon" article 2317;
and (2) the odd definition of constructive knowledge, which misuses the
word "infer" 20' in its apparent attempt to avoid the normal definition
of constructive knowledge. 20 2 More importantly, even if the courts con-
strue the statute sympathetically, the statute may still not protect gov-
ernmental bodies from the bulk of the street and highway cases that
apparently prompted the Legislature to act. Governmental defendants
remain subject to the negligence standard of article 2315; and, as noted
above,2 3 courts could use article 2315 to impose liability in most of the
cases in which the courts have previously relied on article 2317, especially
since Act 454's restrictive definition of constructive knowledge is in-
applicable to claims based on article 2315.
198. La. R.S. 9:2800(A) (Supp. 1986), as added by 1985 La. Acts No. 454, § 1.
199. La. R.S. 9:2800(B) (Supp. 1986).
200. La. R.S. 9:2800(C) (Supp. 1986).
201. What the Legislature apparently meant was that constructive notice means the
existence of facts from which actual knowledge can be inferred. See, e.g., W. Strunk &
E. White, The Elements of Style 49 (3d ed. 1979).
202. See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Slayden, 376 So. 2d 97, 99 (La.
1979) (finding constructive notice where the Department of Highways "knew or should
have known of the dangerous condition of the highway by the presence of cattle roaming
thereon"); Davila v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 444 So. 2d 1293, 1296 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1984) (applying "knew or should have known" standard in finding parish had
constructive notice of deterioration in a roadway).
203. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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A constitutional challenge to Act 454 based on the guarantee of
equal protection should fail. The statutory classification is not based
on any of the grounds enumerated in article I, section 3; and so the
courts will require the plaintiff to show that the classification does not
further any legitimate state interest. 0 4 Applying that minimal standard,
the courts should find the conservation of public funds for other public
services an adequate justification for applying a knowledge element in
article 2317 actions against governmental entities.
By contrast, Act 454 appears unlikely to survive a constitutional
attack based on article XII, section 10, the section of the state consti-
tution that waives governmental immunity. The protection afforded by
Act 454-lack of notice of the defect in the property-protects only
governmental defendants, and the supreme court decisions in Jones and
Segura indicate that the constitution's waiver of immunity precludes the
Legislature from granting governmental bodies a substantive defense that
is not available to nongovernmental defendants. Furthermore, none of
the potential exceptions to the waiver limitation appear applicable. The
authority to make general changes in tort doctrine is inapplicable because
the Act does not provide similar treatment to governmental and non-
govermental defendants. The express grant of legislative power to es-
tablish procedures and to provide the effect of judgments does not
validate the statute because it sets substantive standards of liability.
Similarly, the damages exception recognized by Sibley would also be
immaterial because Act 454 changes liability rules. Finally, even a "unique
governmental functions" exception to the waiver would not validate Act
454 because it is not limited to property that presents problems that
are uniquely governmental but rather applies to all governmental property
except buildings.
The likely unconstitutionalilty of Act 454 does not mean that the
Legislature lacks the power to protect governmental bodies from incur-
ring article 2317 liability for defective property when the governmental
entity had no way of knowing of the existence of the defect. Indeed,
one can suggest at least two approaches that would probably allow a
more carefully drafted statute to accomplish the legislative objective in
a manner that would survive constitutional scrutiny. In both cases, the
statute would focus on 2317 claims arising from defective streets and
highways-the cases that formed the bulk of the problem about which
public officials were complaining.
The approach that would be most certain to survive constitutional
scrutiny would limit the knowledge defense to article 2317 claims in-
volving custody of streets and highways but extend the defense to all
custodians, whether or not they are governmental entities. By granting
204. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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the benefit of the defense to the relatively small number of private
parties with custody over streets and roads, the Legislature would take
advantage of its power to make general adjustments in tort liability
rules so long as the content of the rules did not vary with the govern-
mental status of the defendant.
Alternatively, the Legislature might establish a special rule for gov-
ernmental bodies with custody over streets and highways. By limiting
its impact to enumerated types of property that are especially important
to essential governmental functions (the provision of safe streets and
highways for the state's citizens), the Legislature could take advantage
of the "unique governmental functions" exception if the Louisiana
Supreme Court can be persuaded to embrace it.
Act 509
The final 1985 statute addressing the problem of governmental tort
liability is Act 509. Like Acts 450 and 452, Act 509 has as its apparent
aim the desire to reduce the cost of tort judgments regardless of what
substantive standards of liability are applicable. It limits prejudgment
interest in personal injury and wrongful death actions to six percent,
while allowing postjudgment interest to be computed according to, the
normal procedures established in the Code of Civil Procedure.0 5
As initially introduced, the bill that became Act 509 cdmpletely
eliminated prejudgment interest in personal injury and wrongful death
actions.2°6 In that form, it would have provided governmental defendants
with a powerful settlement weapon because the loss of prejudgment
interest could easily reduce the present value of a judgment by one-
third or more, especially if interest rates return to double digits. However,
the Senate amendment 07 that put the statute in its present form has
significantly reduced its value as an inducement to settlement. Now all
the plaintiff loses is the difference between six percent and the current
rate established under the Code of Civil Procedure, 208 and it will take
much longer for that rate to erode the present value of a plaintiff's
judgment.
Act 509 will apply in every successful personal injury suit against
a governmental defendant. Thus, a constitutional challenge to the statute
is virtually certain to arise quickly, and it appears vulnerable to con-
205. La. R.S. 13:5112(C), 5117 (Supp. 1986), as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 509,
§ 1.
206. La. H.R. 1898 Reg. Sess. (1985).
207. Official Journal of the La. Senate for the 37th Day's Proceedings, l1th Reg.
Sess. under the 1974 Const., at 37 (June 24, 1985).
208. As of November 1, 1985, the judicial rate of interest was twelve percent. La.
Code Civ. P. art. 2924 (1985).
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stitutional attack. If the rehearing opinion in Sibley provides a reliable
guide to state equal protection doctrine, the courts should apply the
minimum standard that requires the plaintiff to show that the statutory
classification serves no legitimate state interest.2 09 One might argue that
the statute serves either of two state interests-conserving the public fisc
for essential governmental services and protecting governmental bodies
from the catastrophic impact of extremely large judgments-but the
statute's limited impact and the acknowledged ability of governments
to refuse to pay unmanageable judgments might lead a court to conclude
that the statutory classification does not substantially further either
interest. In addition, the statute grants a protection to governmental
entities that is not available to other defendants. As a result, it would
seem to violate the constitutional waiver of governmental immunity unless
the Louisiana Supreme Court adheres to the damages exception to the
immunity doctrine that it applied on orginal hearing in Sibley.210
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion suggests that the net impact of the 1985
statutes may be fairly limited. Indeed, that conclusion seems imminently
defensible in view of the minimal impact of Acts 451, 452, and 509;
the uncertain judicial implementation of Acts 450, 453, and 454; and
the probable unconstitutionality of Act 454, which was the centerpiece
of the 1985 reforms. Although one might take a more optimimistic view
of several of the new laws (particularly Acts 450, 451, and 453), it
seems unlikely that the 1985 statutes will offer the final word on gov-
ernmental tort liability in the state in view of the ambiguities and
constitutional challenges detailed above.
Of course, one must acknowledge the possibility that the Legislature
may have been less interested in specific reforms than in sending a
"message" to the state's appellate courts. If that was the Legislature's
aim, it may have been less concerned with the technical details of the
new laws than in making certain that the judges know that the people
who elect them as well as the legislators are unhappy with the cost of
the recent expansion of governmental tort liability. But if that was the
Legislature's aim, the preliminary indications suggest that the statutes
are unlikely to have their desired effect. The opinion following the Sibley
rehearing is clearly the most important decision on governmental tort
liability that the Louisiana Supreme Court has rendered since the Leg-
islature adjourned, and it broadens governmental tort liability consid-
erably beyond the decision on original hearing. Perhaps future opinions
209. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
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will reflect a changed perspective in the court, but the current evidence
does not support that hypothesis.
When all is said and done, what Louisiana needs now is precisely what it
has needed since the constitutional abrogation of governmental immunity in
1974-a comprehensive tort claims act that carefully defines the scope of
governmental liability and provides plaintiffs with a method for recovering
judgments. 2' At least the problem has now attracted the Legislature's atten-
tion. If the 1985 statutes fail to achieve the hopes of their sponsors, perhaps
the Legislature can be persuaded to attempt a more comprehensive, and a
more carefully drafted, alternative.
211. See Murchison, supra note 77, at 489.

